Implementations of Availability and Reliability

Multiple Firewall Interfaces

Although we have only one Firewall, different rules may be applied to
each interface. The public servers are segregated at least from the LAN
hosts, and possibly from each other, greatly limiting an attackers
progression though the network should one host fall.
Availability and Reliability
The network security design thus far has revolved around the integrity
of the hosts and network through restricting an attacker’s access to the
hosts and limiting the consequent progression through that network
should a host fall. Each of the security decisions above has also
adversely affected the availability and reliability of the network. Each
multi-homed bastion host (which we will refer to as a firewall in this
context) has introduced another potential point of failure. Each hurdle
we have placed in the path of an attacker has also introduced a
performance bottleneck for genuine users.

The Application Proxy Firewall

Whilst this layered approach presents the ideal solution, two firewalls
involve twice the cost - and Firewall technology and the associated
servers are costly, in some cases too costly.

Multi-Homing

Bastion Hosts

proxy hosts. However, should the router security or an individual
proxy host system be compromised, the entire Corporate LAN could
then be exposed.

Current Security Awareness

Current Security Awareness

You may well dismiss such simplistic network design as historic
network naivety. However co-location of public servers in ISP facilities
rather than at corporate sights has become more prevalent, and the
sheer quantity of companies connecting to the Internet has greatly
increased.
For many of these companies this is an early venture into technology
and they do not have the internal resources available or the
understanding of the potential security implications. As such, many
initial forays into the online world have involved placing public servers
behind an ISP’s co-locate route with no security beyond that
implemented on the server itself (if any). Worse still, they may have a
connection back to the corporate LAN for data transfer or outbound
access, presenting them with the security design issues which many
thought were identified and eliminated years ago.

Masterclass: Network Design Issues

Masterclass: Network Design Issues

Introduction
Throughout the course we have examined the techniques for analyzing
a target network and assessing the machines hosted within. To better
interpret the network results gained through our analysis it is desirable
to understand some of the secure network design philosophies in use
today, particularly those relating to the integration of the Corporate
LAN to the Internet.
Clearly the major concerns over network security relate to the integrity,
reliability and availability of the services and data. We will therefore
address secure network designs from those perspectives.

Initially, many corporate networks that connected to public networks
(i.e. the Internet) relied completely upon their router security at either
end of the serial connection (Figure 14 routers 1 and 2) to protect
internal hosts. In many instances this security was negligible or nonexistent.

Redirecting Traffic

Redirecting Traffic

However forged ARP requests present a way to illicitly re-direct, and
therefore monitor, other hosts traffic.
A forged packet sent to the switch with the target's MAC and IP
address as the source will cause the switch to update its internal maps,
redirecting data intended for the victim to the network sniffer's port. A
NIC in promiscuous mode would therefore be able to monitor the

traffic, and if the local network configuration were modified, the
scanning host could be configured to accept and process the traffic
directly.
Since traffic to any host could (at least temporarily) be usurped, an
upstream gateway could be hoaxed, causing even more traffic to be
redirected.
Many existing tools utilize this technique to compromise switch
security, including:
• dsniff.
• hunt.
• arptool.

UNC Share Risk

Referring again to L0pht Crack's password sniffing ability, to overcome
the nature of a switched network without attacking the switch, an email
could be engineered with a URL within it pointing to a UNC on
the machine running the sniffer. Should a target user click on the link,
their username and password hashes would be passed directly to the
sniffing host in an attempt to access the resource, and L0pht Crack
would therefore be able to capture and crack the accompanying
password. Although this requires interaction from the targeted user, the
link could be disguised and made sufficiently enticing to ensure a fairly
high success rate in engineering user response.

HACKING OF AIRTEL, BSNL AND TATA DOCOMO

HACKING OF AIRTEL, BSNL AND TATA DOCOMO

airtelgprs

create a new apn settings
access point  : airtelgprs.com
proxy : 85.31.186.21
port : 80
and home page : 202.46.201.112

bsnl

the proxy given below.....
1.
i.p.Adderss: 12.148.192.178
Port :1080(common for all) 
2.
i.p.Adderss: 63.127.192.178
3.
i.p.Adderss: 199.105.112.152
4.

i.p.Adderss: 199.105.112.163 
5.
i.p.Adderss: 12.148.162.37.......

DOCOMO

Create new settings in your mobile phone

profile Name-Hackingworld

Proxy Address--220.226.181.88

Proxy Port--8080

APN or Access Point--tata.docomo.dive.in

HomePage--122.170.122.214 ,http://122.170.122.214,or any working url

Now Save the setting and make it default setting in your mobile phone.Restart the phone and now follow below steps

Now download any opera handler apps.If you don't have request here,I will provide you free handler app.Install the app and start the handler

When you open handler you"l find Socket Server.In socket server put these line

Address Learning

Address Learning

Address learning enables switches to pass traffic far more efficiently,
and securely, than hubs. The switch maps the MAC address (or IP
address in the case of more modern Layer 3 switches) of a device to a
particular port so data destined for the device can be forwarded
directly to that port, as opposed to forwarding to all ports. This reduces
the load on the individual LAN segments, and inhibits conventional
sniffing methods, as only traffic intended for a specific host is passed to
its NIC. Only broadcast packets (such as ARP requests, bootp/ DHCP
and NBT) will be received by all hosts in a broadcast domain. The
distribution of broadcast traffic can be further limited by segregating
the IP subnet space and utilizing virtual networks (such as CISCO
VLANs).
Under normal circumstances on a switched network, this means that by
simply traffic sniffing the wire, data that was not intended for the
scanning host (other than network broadcast traffic) will not be sent to
the port, and will not therefore be monitored.

Sniffing on a Switched Network

Sniffing on a Switched Network

Traditional hub based networks propagate packets to all attached
devices, operating in a single broadcast domain. This means all devices
can receive all the data transmitted on a broadcast media such as
Ethernet. Hubs act as multiport repeaters, no manipulation or routing
of the packets occur, the signal is simply regenerated to avoid
attenuation.

Switches differ from hubs in that they do process the data being
transmitted, and change their behavior accordingly. Switches facilitate:
• Address learning
• Packet forwarding
• Packet filtering
• Loop avoidance