The area stretching from northern Kwangtung along the
Hunan-Kiangsi border into southern Hupeh lies entirely within the Lohsiao
mountain range. We have traversed the whole range, and a comparison of its different
sections shows that the middle section, with Ningkang as its centre, is the
most suitable for our armed independent regime. The northern section has
terrain which is less suitable for our taking either the offensive or the
defensive, and it is too close to the enemy's big political centres. Besides,
stationing large forces in the area of Liuyang, Liling, Pinghsiang and Tungku
would involve a considerable risk, unless we plan a quick seizure of Changsha
or Wuhan. The southern section has better terrain than the northern, but our
mass base there is not as good as in the middle section, nor can we exert as
great a political influence on Hunan and Kiangsi from it as we can from the
middle section, from which any move can affect the lower river valleys of the
two provinces. The middle section has the following advantages: (1) a mass
base, which we have been cultivating for more than a year; (2) a fairly good
basis for the Party organizations; (3) local armed forces which have been built
up for more than a year and are well experienced in struggle--a rare
achievement--and which, coupled with the Fourth Red Army, will prove
indestructible in the face of any enemy force; (4) an excellent military base,
the Chingkang Mountains, and bases for our local armed forces in all the
counties; and (5) the influence it can exert on the two provinces and on the
lower valleys of their rivers, an influence endowing it with much more
political importance than that possessed by southern Hunan or southern Kiangsi,
the influence of either of which can reach out only to its own province, or
only to the upper river valley and the hinterland of its own province. The
disadvantage of the middle section is that, since it has long been under the
independent regime and is confronted by the enemy's large "encirclement
and suppression" forces, its economic problems, especially the shortage of
cash, are extremely difficult.
As for a plan of action here, the Hunan Provincial Committee
advocated three different plans within a few weeks in June and July. First Yuan
The-sheng came and approved our plan to establish political power in the middle
section of the Lohsiao mountain range. Then Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang Kai-ming
came and urged that the Red Army should move towards southern Hunan without the
least hesitation and leave a force of only two hundred rifles behind to defend
the border area together with the Red Guards; this, they said, was the
"absolutely correct" policy. The third time, barely ten days later,
Yuan The-sheng came again with a letter which, besides rebuking us at great
length, urged that the Red Army should set out for eastern Hunan; this was
again described as the "absolutely correct" policy, to be carried out
"without the least hesitation". These rigid directives put us in a
real dilemma, because failure to comply would be tantamount to disobedience,
while compliance would mean certain defeat. When the second message came, the
Army Committee, the Border Area Special Committee and the Yunghsin County
Committee of the Party met in a joint session and decided against carrying out
the Provincial Committee's instructions, as it was considered dangerous to move
towards southern Hunan. But a few days later, Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang Kai-ming,
persisting in the Provincial Party Committee's plan and taking advantage of the
29th Regiment's homesickness, dragged the Red Army off to attack the county
town of Chenchou, thus bringing defeat both to the border area and to the Red
Army. The Red Army lost about half its men, and countless houses were burned
down and innumerable people massacred in the border area; county after county
fell to the enemy and some of them have not been recovered to this day. As for
moving to eastern Hunan, it was certainly inadvisable for the main forces of
the Red Army to do so unless there was a split among the ruling landlords of
Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi Provinces. If we had not advanced on southern Hunan in
July, we would not only have averted the August defeat in the border area, but
we could also have exploited the fighting between the Kuomintang's Sixth Army
and Wang Chun's Kuomintang forces in Changshu, Kiangsi Province, to crush the
enemy forces in Yunghsin, overrun Kian and Anfu, and make it possible for our
advanced guard to reach Pinghsiang and establish contact with the Fifth Red
Army in the northern section of the Lohsiao mountain range. Even if all that
had happened, the proper place for our general headquarters should have still
been Ningkang, and only guerrilla forces should have been dispatched to eastern
Hunan. Since fighting had not broken out among the landlords and since
formidable enemy forces were still in Pinghsiang, Chaling and Yuhsien on the
Hunan border, we would have been giving the enemy his chance if we had moved
our main forces northward. The Central Committee asked us to consider an
advance on eastern or on southern Hunan, but either course was very dangerous;
although the proposed expedition to eastern Hunan has not been carried out, the
expedition to southern Hunan has proved a failure. This painful experience is
always worth remembering.
We are not yet in a period when the regime of the landlord class
has split up, and the "suppression" forces of the enemy deployed
round the border area still number more than ten regiments. But if we can
continue to find ways of getting cash (food and clothing no longer being a big
problem), then, with the foundation for our work established in the border
area, we shall be able to cope with these enemy forces, and even with larger
ones. As far as the border area is concerned, it would at once suffer devastation,
just as it did in August, if the Red Army moved away. Although not all our Red
Guards would be wiped out, the Party and our mass base would receive a
crippling blow, and while there are places in the mountains where we might
retain a foothold, in the plains we would all have to go underground as in
August and September. If the Red Army does not move away, then, building on the
foundations we already have, we shall be able gradually to expand to
surrounding areas and our prospects will be very bright. If we want to enlarge
the Red Army, the only way is to engage the enemy in a prolonged struggle in
the vicinity of the Chingkang Mountains where we have a good mass base, namely,
in the counties of Ningkang, Yunghsin, Linghsien and Suichuan, utilizing in this
struggle the divergence of interests between the enemy forces of Hunan and
Kiangsi Provinces, their need to defend themselves on all sides and their
consequent inability to concentrate their forces. We can gradually enlarge the
Red Army by the use of correct tactics, fighting no battle unless we can win it
and capture arms and men. With the preparatory work that had already been done
among the masses in the border area between April and July, the Red Army could
undoubtedly have been enlarged in August had its major detachment not made its
expedition to southern Hunan. Despite that mistake, the Red Army has returned
to the border area where the terrain is favourable and the people are friendly,
and the prospects are not bad even now. Only through the determination to fight
and stamina in fighting in places such as the border area can the Red Army add
to its arms and train up good men. The Red Flag has been kept flying in the
border area for a whole year. It has incurred the bitter hatred of the landlord
class of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi and indeed of that of the whole country, but
it is steadily raising the hopes of the workers, peasants and soldiers in the
surrounding provinces. Consider the soldiers. Because the warlords are making
the "bandit-suppression" campaign against the border area their major
task and are issuing such statements as "a year has been spent and a
million dollars used up in the effort to suppress the bandits" (Lu
Ti-ping), or the Red Army "has 20,000 men with 5,000 rifles" (Wang
Chun), the attention of their soldiers and disheartened junior officers is
gradually turned towards us, and more and more of them will break away from the
enemy to join our ranks, thus providing the Red Army with another source of
recruitment. Besides, the fact that the Red Flag has never been lowered in the
border area shows at once the strength of the Communist Party and the
bankruptcy of the ruling classes, and this is of nation-wide political
significance. Therefore, we hold, as we have always held, that it is absolutely
necessary and correct to build up and expand Red political power in the middle
section of the Lohsiao mountain range.
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