1.6. A Model for Network Security
A model for much of what we will be discussing is captured,
in very general terms, in Figure 1.5. A
message is to be transferred from one party to another across some sort of
internet. The two parties, who are the principals
in this transaction, must cooperate for the exchange to take place. A logical
information channel is established by defining a route through the internet from
source to destination and by the cooperative use of communication protocols
(e.g., TCP/IP) by the two principals.
Security aspects come into play when it is necessary or
desirable to protect the information transmission from an opponent who may
present a threat to confidentiality, authenticity, and so on. All the techniques for
providing security have two components:
-
A security-related transformation on the information to be sent. Examples include the encryption of the message, which scrambles the message so that it is unreadable by the opponent, and the addition of a code based on the contents of the message, which can be used to verify the identity of the sender
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Some secret information shared by the two principals and, it is hoped, unknown to the opponent. An example is an encryption key used in conjunction with the transformation to scramble the message before transmission and unscramble it on reception.[
A trusted third party may be needed to achieve secure
transmission. For example, a third party may be responsible for distributing the
secret information to the two principals while keeping it from any opponent. Or
a third party may be needed to arbitrate disputes between the two principals
concerning the authenticity of a message transmission.
This general model shows that there are four basic tasks in
designing a particular security service:
-
Design an algorithm for performing the security-related transformation. The algorithm should be such that an opponent cannot defeat its purpose.
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Generate the secret information to be used with the algorithm.
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Develop methods for the distribution and sharing of the secret information.
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Specify a protocol to be used by the two principals that makes use of the security algorithm and the secret information to achieve a particular security service.
Parts One
through Three of this book
concentrates on the types of security mechanisms and services that fit into the
model shown in Figure 1.5. However, there
are other security-related situations of interest that do not neatly fit this
model but that are considered in this book. A general model of these other
situations is illustrated by Figure 1.6,
which reflects a concern for protecting an information system from unwanted
access. Most readers are familiar with the concerns caused by the existence of
hackers, who attempt to penetrate systems that can be accessed over a network.
The hacker can be someone who, with no malign intent, simply gets satisfaction
from breaking and entering a computer system. Or, the intruder can be a
disgruntled employee who wishes to do damage, or a criminal who seeks to exploit
computer assets for financial gain (e.g., obtaining credit card numbers or
performing illegal money transfers).
Another type of unwanted access is the placement in a computer
system of logic that exploits vulnerabilities in the system and that can affect
application programs as well as utility programs, such as editors and compilers.
Programs can present two kinds of threats:
-
Information access threats intercept or modify data on behalf of users who should not have access to that data.
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Service threats exploit service flaws in computers to inhibit use by legitimate users.
Viruses and worms are two examples of software attacks. Such
attacks can be introduced into a system by means of a disk that contains the
unwanted logic concealed in otherwise useful software. They can also be inserted
into a system across a network; this latter mechanism is of more concern in
network security.
The security mechanisms needed to cope with unwanted access
fall into two broad categories . The first category might be termed a gatekeeper function. It includes
password-based login procedures that are designed to deny access to all but
authorized users and screening logic that is designed to detect and reject
worms, viruses, and other similar attacks. Once either an unwanted user or
unwanted software gains access, the second line of defense consists of a variety
of internal controls that monitor activity and analyze stored information in an
attempt to detect the presence of unwanted intruders. These issues are explored .
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