Our workers' and peasants' democratic republic is a state, but
today it is not yet a full-fledged one. Today we are still in the period of
strategic defensive in the civil war, the form of our political power is still
far from that of a full-fledged state, our army is still much inferior to the
enemy both in numbers and technical equipment, our territory is still very
small, and our enemy is constantly out to destroy us and will never rest
content till he has done so. In defining our policy on the basis of these
facts, we should not repudiate guerrilla-ism in general terms but should
honestly admit the guerrilla character of the Red Army. It is no use being
ashamed of this. On the contrary, this guerrilla character is precisely our
distinguishing feature, our strong point, and our means of defeating the enemy.
We should be prepared to discard it, but we cannot do so today. In the future
this guerrilla character will definitely become something to be ashamed of and
to be discarded, but today it is invaluable and we must stick to it.
"Fight when you can win, move away when you can't
win"--this is the popular way of describing our mobile warfare today.
There is no military expert anywhere in the world who approves only of fighting
and never of moving, though few people do as much moving as we do. We generally
spend more time in moving than in fighting and would be doing well if we fought
an average of one sizable battle a month. All our "moving" is for the
purpose of "fighting", and all our strategy and tactics are built on
"fighting". Nevertheless, there are times when it is inadvisable for
us to fight. In the first place, it is inadvisable to fight when the force
confronting us is too large; second, it is sometimes inadvisable to fight when
the force confronting us, though not so large, is very dose to other enemy
forces; third, it is generally inadvisable to fight an enemy force that is not
isolated and is strongly entrenched; fourth, it is inadvisable to continue an
engagement in which there is no prospect of victory. In any one of these
situations we are prepared to move away. Such moving away is both permissible
and necessary. For our recognition of the necessity of moving away is based on
our recognition of the necessity of fighting. Herein lies the fundamental
characteristic of the Red Army's mobile warfare.
Mobile warfare is primary, but we do not reject positional warfare
where it is possible and necessary. It should be admitted that positional
warfare should be employed for the tenacious defence of particular key points
in a containing action during the strategic defensive, and when, during the
strategic offensive, we encounter an enemy force that is isolated and cut off
from help. We have had considerable experience in defeating the enemy by such
positional warfare; we have cracked open many enemy cities, blockhouses and
forts and broken through fairly well-fortified enemy field positions. In future
we shall increase our efforts and remedy our inadequacies in this respect. We
should by all means advocate positional attack or defence when circumstances
require and permit it. At the present time, what we are opposed to is the
general use of positional warfare or putting it on an equal footing with
mobile` warfare; that is impermissible.
During the ten years' civil war, have there been no changes
whatsoever in the guerrilla character of the Red Army, its lack of fixed battle
lines, the fluidity of its base areas, or the fluidity of construction work in
its base areas? Yes, there have been changes. The period from the days in the
Chingkang Mountains to our first counter-campaign against "encirclement
and suppression" in Kiangsi was the first stage, the stage in which the
guerrilla character and fluidity were very pronounced, the Red Army being in
its infancy and the base areas still being guerrilla zones. In the second
stage, comprising the period from the first to the third counter-campaign, both
the guerrilla character and the fluidity were considerably reduced, front armies
having been formed and base areas with a population of several millions
established. In the third stage, which comprised the period from the end of the
third to the fifth counter-campaign, the guerrilla character and the fluidity
were further reduced, and a central government and a revolutionary military
commission had already been set up. The fourth stage was the Long March. The
mistaken rejection of guerrilla warfare and fluidity on a small scale had led
to guerrilla warfare and fluidity on a great scale. Now we are in the fifth
stage. Because of our failure to smash the fifth "encirclement and
suppression" campaign and because of this great fluidity, the Red Army and
the base areas have been greatly reduced, but we have planted our feet in the
Northwest and consolidated and developed the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border
Region, our base area here. The three front armies which form the main forces
of the Red Army have been brought under a unified command, which is
unprecedented.
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