A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE
January 5, 1930
[This was a letter written by Comrade Mao
Tse-tung in criticism of certain pessimistic views then existing in the Party.]
Some comrades in our Party still do not know how to appraise the
current situation correctly and how to settle the attendant question of what
action to take. Though they believe that a revolutionary high tide is
inevitable, they do not believe it to be imminent. Therefore, they disapprove
of the plan to take Kiangsi and only approve of roving guerrilla actions in the
three areas on the borders of Fukien, Kwangtung and Kiangsi; at the same time,
as they do not have a deep understanding of what it means to establish Red
political power in the guerrilla areas, they do not have a deep understanding
of the idea of accelerating the nation-wide revolutionary high tide through the
consolidation and expansion of Red political power. They seem to think that,
since the revolutionary high tide is still remote, it will be labour lost to
attempt to establish political power by hard work. Instead, they want to extend
our political influence through the easier method of roving guerrilla actions,
and, once the masses throughout the country have been won over, or more or less
won over, they want to launch a nation-wide armed insurrection which, with the
participation of the Red Army, would become a great nationwide revolution.
Their theory that we must first win over the masses on a country-wide scale and
in all regions and then establish political power does not accord with the
actual state of the Chinese revolution. This theory derives mainly from the
failure to understand clearly that China is a semi-colonial country for which
many imperialist powers are contending. If one clearly understands this, one
will understand first why the unusual phenomenon of prolonged and tangled
warfare within the ruling classes is only to be found in China, why this
warfare is steadily growing fiercer and spreading, and why there has never been
a unified regime. Secondly, one will understand the gravity of the peasant
problem and hence why rural uprisings have developed on the present
country-wide scale. Thirdly, one will understand the correctness of the slogan
of workers' and peasants' democratic political power. Fourthly, one will
understand another unusual phenomenon, which is also absent outside China, and
which follows from the first (that in China alone there is prolonged and
tangled warfare within the ruling classes), namely, the existence and
development of the Red Army and the guerrilla forces, and together with them,
the existence and development of small Red areas encircled by the White regime.
Fifthly, one will understand that in semi-colonial China the establishment and
expansion of the Red Army, the guerrilla forces and the Red areas is the
highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat, the
inevitable outcome of the growth of the semi-colonial peasant struggle, and
undoubtedly the most important factor in accelerating the revolutionary high
tide throughout the country. And sixthly, one will also understand that the
policy which merely calls for roving guerrilla actions cannot accomplish the
task of accelerating this nation-wide revolutionary high tide, while the kind
of policy adopted by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung and also by Fang Chih-min [1] is undoubtedly correct--that is, the policy of establishing base
areas; of systematically setting up political power; of deepening the agrarian
revolution; of expanding the people's armed forces by a comprehensive process
of building up first the township Red Guards, then the district Red Guards,
then the county Red Guards, then the local Red Army troops, all the way up to
the regular Red Army troops; of spreading political power by advancing in a
series of waves; etc., etc. Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of
the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has built
it throughout the world. Only thus is it possible to create tremendous
difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their foundations and
hasten their internal disintegration. Only thus is it really possible to create
a Red Army which will become the chief weapon for the great revolution of the
future. In short, only thus is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high
tide.
Comrades who suffer from revolutionary impetuosity overestimate
the subjective forces of the revolution [2] and underestimate the forces of the counter-revolution. Such an
appraisal stems mainly from subjectivism. In the end, it undoubtedly leads to
putschism. On the other hand, underestimating the subjective forces of the
revolution and overestimating the forces of the counter-revolution would also
constitute an improper appraisal and be certain to produce bad results of
another kind. Therefore, in judging the political situation in China it is
necessary to understand the following:
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