Monday 18 February 2013

Are There Any Benefits to Corruption?


Are There Any Benefits to Corruption?

Despite the many problems caused by corruption, some argue that keeping corrupt
systems in place may be necessary to guarantee stability in the short term. Corruption
may be a way of life in many societies, or may be necessary to survival when the
systems, institutions, and processes that should protect the safety and well-being of
citizens are weak or completely lacking. In addition, corruption can be perceived as
beneficial in a society where patronage networks ensure that some benefits are
channeled down to the poorer members of the community. There are also some who
argue that “grand” corruption is not always negative. They argue that it can help
contribute to internal stability by creating or sustaining patronage networks and as an
incentive for opposition movements to participate in the political and economic system.
But such a system also helps sow the seed of discontent among the vast majority who
do not benefit from such networks of patronage and corruption.
“Taking apart corruption networks can do more harm than good because they are part of
the system,” says Daniel Serwer at USIP, who adds that rooting out corrupt individuals
often needs to be done very carefully and over time. Sometimes, if this is done too
abruptly when other institutions of governance aren’t yet in place, more violence can
result. “Reformers need to ask what is likely to happen if they decide to upset
established corrupt relationships or those based on intimidation and fear,” adds Susan
Rose-Ackerman at a forum on corruption at Tufts University. “Unless care is taken, a
sharp break with a corrupt status quo can breed instability and violence as those who
benefited from the corrupt system struggle to maintain their position.”26 In Afghanistan,

attempts to halt corruption associated with the production and trade of opium controlled
by local warlords led to increased violence.
In order to secure at least some measure of stability, peacebuilders often find
themselves in the unenviable position of having to work with or make deals with those
perpetrating conflict, such as warlords or corrupt officials who make deals with those
conflict entrepreneurs who profit from sustaining conflict and unstable conditions. In
other words, curtailing and preventing violence by helping maintain some system of
governance, even if broken and dysfunctional, may take priority over accountability and
rule of law.
For example, warlords, and often the military commanders under them, often prefer to
see a conflict continue. The conflict may give them access to valuable state resources
(like gold or diamonds) and building corruption networks around these “spoils” keeps
them in power. Such networks are often closely associated with other illicit—but

lucrative—trades in human trafficking, weapons, and drugs. However, sometimes peace
agreements cannot be reached and peace sustained without including the bad guys and
giving in to their terms. When a conflict comes to an end, warlords are not very inclined
to give up their money or their power. And, trying to get rid of them may result in failed
peace agreements and a rise in violence that inevitably results in civilian suffering and
atrocities.
For these reasons, there may be an attempt to “buy off” potential peace spoilers. What
that means in practice is that power-sharing arrangements are given to the parties in
conflict, or they may be offered plum positions in a new government. Although this
practice has been important for ending civil wars and creating a more secure
environment for the populace in the short term, many are less optimistic about the longterm
impacts. When potential spoilers have control of state resources or positions, it can
increase corruption and make it that much harder to establish functioning governments.
The mix of electoral politics and power-sharing arrangements in a peace accord can
often lead to weak institutions and undermine accountability as each faction asserts
control over its own territorial or institutional turf, which leads to different sets of rules
and authorities. Individuals in these positions may reward their own political parties and
support networks rather than distribute the resources of the state in an impartial manner.
From a moral standpoint, citizens too may wonder where the justice is in a system in
which those who have perpetrated a conflict are awarded with top positions. Thus,
governmental figures and institutions have less credibility in the eyes of the populace,
which makes governing harder and less effective.
After 2002 peace agreements in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the “main former
rebel leaders were all made vice presidents in the government, granting them unfettered
access to political and economic resources.”27 The result of such an arrangement,
according to a report by the International Crises Group several years later, was that
“state resources [were] siphoned off to fund election campaigns and private accounts.
Between 60 and 80 per cent of customs revenues [were] estimated to be embezzled, a
quarter of the national budget [was] not properly accounted for, and millions of dollars
[were] misappropriated in the army and state-run companies.”28 Institutions of
governance still remain very weak in the country—despite democratic elections held in
2006—and fighting still rages in the eastern part of the country.
Practitioners in the field are more than aware of the trade-offs between short-term
stability and long-term peace. And, tolerating corruption may factor into this mix. “The
relationship between corruption and peacebuilding is … characterized by a recurring
tension between accepting (or even encouraging) forms of corruption in the short term to
attain greater stability and the need to counter it in the longer term in order to lay the
foundations for legitimate political institutions and sustainable economic development.”29


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