The purely military viewpoint is very highly developed among a
number of comrades in the Red Army. It manifests itself as follows:
1. These comrades regard military affairs and politics as opposed
to each other and refuse to recognize that military affairs are only one means
of accomplishing political tasks. Some even say, "If you are good
militarily, naturally you are good politically; if you are not good militarily,
you cannot be any good politically"--this is to go a step further and give
military affairs a leading position over politics.
2. They think that the task of the Red Army like that of the White
army, is merely to fight. They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is
an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution.
Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to
fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should
shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing
the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political
power and setting up Party organizations. The Red Army fights not merely for
the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses,
organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political
power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army
loses the reason for its existence.
3. Hence, organizationally, these comrades subordinate the
departments of the Red Army doing political work to those doing military work,
and put forward the slogan, "Let Army Headquarters handle outside matters."
If allowed to develop, this idea would involve the danger of estrangement from
the masses, control of the government by the army and departure from
proletarian leadership-- it would be to take the path of warlordism like the
Kuomintang army.
4. At the same time, in propaganda work they overlook the
importance of propaganda teams. On the question of mass organization, they
neglect the organizing of soldiers' committees in the army and the organizing
of the local workers and peasants. As a result, both propaganda and
organizational work are abandoned.
5. They become conceited when a battle is won and dispirited when
a battle is lost.
6. Selfish departmentalism--they think only of the Fourth Army and
do not realize that it is an important task of the Red Army to arm the local
masses. This is cliquism in a magnified form.
7. Unable to see beyond their limited environment in the Fourth
Army, a few comrades believe that no other revolutionary forces exist. Hence
their extreme addiction to the idea of conserving strength and avoiding action.
This is a remnant of opportunism.
8. Some comrades, disregarding the subjective and objective
conditions, suffer from the malady of revolutionary impetuosity; they will not
take pains to do minute and detailed work among the masses, but, riddled with
illusions, want only to do big things. This is a remnant of putschism.[1]
The sources of the purely military viewpoint are:
1. A low political level. From this flows the failure to recognize
the role of political leadership in the army and to recognize that the Red Army
and the White army are fundamentally different.
2. The mentality of mercenaries. Many prisoners captured in past
battles have joined the Red Army, and such elements bring with them a markedly
mercenary outlook, thereby providing a basis in the lower ranks for
the purely military viewpoint.
3. From the two preceding causes there arises a third,
overconfidence in military strength and absence of confidence in the strength
of the masses of the people.
4 The Party's failure actively to attend to and discuss military
work is also a reason for the emergence of the purely military viewpoint among
a number of comrades.
The methods of correction are as follows:
1. Raise the political level in the Party by means of education,
destroy the theoretical roots of the purely military viewpoint, and be dear on
the fundamental difference between the Red Army and the White army. At the same
time, eliminate the remnants of opportunism and putschism and break down the
selfish departmentalism of the Fourth Army.
2. Intensify the political training of officers and men and
especially the education of ex-prisoners. At the same time, as far as possible
let the local governments select workers and peasants experienced in struggle
to join the Red Army, thus organizationally weakening or even eradicating the
purely military viewpoint.
3. Arouse the local Party organizations to criticize the Party
organizations in the Red Army and the organs of mass political power to
criticize the Red Army itself, in order to influence the Party organizations
and the officers and men of the Red Army.
4. The Party must actively attend to and discuss military work.
All the work must be discussed and decided upon by the Party before being
carried out by the rank and file.
5. Draw up Red Army rules and regulations which dearly define its
tasks, the relationship between its military and its political apparatus, the
relationship between the Red Army and the masses of the people, and the powers
and functions of the soldiers' committees and their relationship with the
military and political organizations.
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